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Abstract
Genocide was declared an international crime in 1946. In response to this declaration, the
Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide was adopted in 1948. Al-
though 28 years have passed, the United States has not yet determined its position, with respect
to the Convention and this international compact is still pending before the Senate. This article
is concerned primarily with the probable impact of the United States’ position on the Genocide
Convention in light of international law and relations. The body of the Convention is discussed
and analyzed along with three proposed United States’ understandings. It is argued that, as the
United States is now reestablishing its moral leadership in the world, ratification of the Genocide
Convention is in our national interest as a statement of faith in our national principles and of the
readiness to develop international law on human rights.
NOTES
A STATEMENT OF MORAL PURPOSE:
THE 1948 GENOCIDE CONVENTION
I. INTRODUCTION
Genocide, the word which brings to mind the most heinous of human
actions, was declared an international crime in 1946 by the United
Nations General Assembly.1 In response to this declaration, the Conven-
tion on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 2 was adopted
in 1948. 3 Since that time, 83 governments,4 including those of almost
every major nation in the world, have become parties. The Convention,
essentially a moral and symbolic document in terms of substance, came
into force in 1951. 5 Although 28 years have passed, the United States
has not yet determined its position, with respect to the Convention, and6
this international compact is still pending before the Senate. This
article is concerned primarily with the probable impact of the United
States'position on the Genocide Convention in light of international
law and relations. The body of the Convention is discussed and analyzed
along with the three proposed United States'understandings. It is
argued that, as the United States is now reestablishing its moral leader-
ship in the world, ratification of the Genocide Convention is in our
national interest as a statement of faith in our own national principles
and of the readiness to develop international law on human rights.
1. G.A. Res. 96, U.N. Doc. A/231, at 3 (1946).
2. Adopted Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
3. Adopted by resolution by a vote of 56 to 0. G.A. Res. 260, U.N.
Doc. A/760, at 9 (1948).
4. Hearings on the Int'l Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1977) (Opening Statement of Hon, Richard
Stone) [hereinafter cited as 1977 Hearings].
5. Adopted Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, came into force Jan. 12, 1951.
6. See generally 1977 Hearings.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF UNITED STATES RESPONSE r
When the United States signed the Convention on-December 11, 1948,
7
the effectiveness of the signature was subject to ratification following
the advice and consent of the United States Senate. President Truman
first submitted the Genocide Convention to the Senate for consideration
on June 16, 1949. 8 The President's message and the Convention were
referred to a subcommittee on Foreign Relations which conducted hearings
in January and February of 1950.9 At these hearings, there were a large
number of witnesses who spoke for and against ratification.10  In May
1950 the special subcommittee reported favorably on the Convention to
the full committee recommending three understandings and one. declara-
tion. 11 The full committee, however, did not take any action. 12 Five
years later, the Eisenhower administration announced its lack of
interest in the Genocide Convention.1
3
No further action was taken on the Convention until President Nixon,
on February 19, 1970, requested that the Senate consent to ratification.
14
7. 78 U.N.T.S. 277, 310.
8. President's Message to Congress Transmitting a Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Exec. 0. 81st
Cong., 1st Sess., 95 Cong. Rec. 7825 (June 16, 1949).
9. Hearings on the Int'l Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on
Foreign Relations, 81 Cong., 2nd Sess. 2 (1950) (hereinafter
cited as 1950 Hearings).
10. See generally Id.
11. S. Rep. No. 92-6, 92nd Cong,, Ist Sess. 2 (1971); See note 28,
infra, which comprises the same basic purpose.
12. S. Rep. No. 92-6, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1971).
13. 32 Dep't. State Bull. 820, 822 (1955).
14. 116 Cong. Rec. 4167-68 (1970).
New hearings were conducted in April and May of 1970 by a Foreign
15
Affairs subcommittee. The Senate, however, again failed to act on
the Genocide Convention.16 In order to accommodate witnesses who had
not testified, the subcommittee considering the Genocide Convention
17
decided to hold additional hearings on March 10, 1971. After these
hearings, the full committee reported favorably on the Convention
with three understandings and one declaration, and recommended in
May 1971, that the Senate ratify.1 8 Once again, no further action was19
taken by the Senate. The issue was reconsidered in 1973 when a
20
subcommittee recommended consent subject to the 1971 conditions. In
its report, the subcommittee included a draft of implementing legisla-
21
tion with its recommendations. As in the past, the matter never
reached the Senate for a vote.
The Genocide Convention was debated by the Senate in executive
22
session in January and February of 1974. Two motions for cloture of
debate on the Convention failed by a narrow margin, to achieve the
needed two-thirds vote in the Senate.
2 3
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee discussed the Convention
on April 13, 1978, again favoring Senatorial consent to ratification.
24
15. Hearings on the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1970).
16. S. Rep. No. 92-6, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. iii (1971).
17. Hearings on the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Genocide Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations,
92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
18. S. Rep. No. 92-6, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. 18-19 (1971). See
note 28, infra, for text,
19. S. Rep. No. 93-5, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as 1973 Report].
20. Id. at 19.
21. Id. at S. 3182, 92nd Cong,, 2nd Sess. 21-23 (1972) (appendix).
22. 120 Cong. Rec. 954-67 (1974).
23. 120 Cong. Rec. 2338-39 (1974).
24. Investigation into Certain Past Instances of Genocide and Exploration
of Policy Options for the Future, Hearings before the Subcomm. on
Future Foreign Policy Research and Development of the House Comm.
on International Relations, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1976).
The Committee noted, as a significant development, that the American
Bar Association had reversed its earlier opposition and now supported
ratification.2 5 President Carter, in his address to the United Nations
on March 17, 1977, publicly announced his intention to work closely26
with Congress in seeking ratification of the Convention. The Conven-
tion again was debated on the Senate floor in May of 1977, which was
favorable towards ratification.
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III. POSSIBLE SCENARIOS REGARDING UNITED STATES RATIFICATION
Every Senate committee and subcommittee hearing on ratification of
the Genocide Convention has conditioned its recommendation of accession
28
on the inclusion of three understandings and one declaration. Ratifi-
cation by the United States of the Convention with these understandings
25. 1977 Hearings, supra note 4, at 42-43. Statement of Bruno v. Bitker,
Chairman, Committee on International Human Rights, Section on
International Law, American Bar Association, Washington, D.C.
26. 1977 Hearings, supra note 4, at 138, President Carter's address
to the UN General Assembly, March 17, 1977.
27. Id.
28. See generally Id., where the understandings and declarations were
discussed favorably. See also 1973 Report, supra note 18, at 19.
The purpose is to effect the position of the United States more
clearly. The text is as follows: 1. That the United States
Government understands and construes the words, "intent to destroy,
in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious
group as such" appearing in Article II, to mean the intent to
destroy a national, ethnical, racial or religious group by the
acts specified in Article II in such manner as to affect a substan-
tial part of the group concerned. 2. That the United States
Government understands and construes the words "mental harm"
appearing in Article II (b) of this Convention to mean permanent
impairment of mental faculties. 3. That the United States Govern-
ment understands and contrues Article VI of the Convention in
accordance with the agreed language of the Report of the Legal
Committee of the United Nations General Assembly that nothing in
Article VI shall affect the right of any State to bring to trial
before its own tribunal any of its nationals for acts committed
outside the State. 4, That the United States Government declares
that it will not deposit its instrument of ratification until
after the implementing legislation referred to in Article V has
been enacted. Id.
and declarations gives rise to three possible scenarios.29  First, the
rights and obligations of the United States would be governed by
30
customary international law. This scenario would manifest itself if
the United States fails to ratify the Convention or, assuming United
States ratification, the International Court of Justice rules that the
understandings and declaration are incompatible with the object and
purpose of the Convention, thereby nullifying the supposed ratifica-
31
tion. Second, the rights and obligations of the United States would
32
be determined under the Genocide Convention. This scenario would
arise from United States ratification without understandings, or if the
International Court of Justice or parties to the Convention accepted
the statements as less than reservations and as being appropriate and
33
correct. Third, United States obligations and rights would be modified
by its reservations if deemed compatible with the object and purpose
of the Convention by the International Court of Justice.34 The result
would be a situation in which the member states accepting the under-
standings would consider themselves to be in a treaty relationship with
the United States, although others objecting would not.
29. Comment, The United States and the 1948 Genocide Convention, 16
Harv. Int'l. L.J. 686-87 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Harvard
Comment].
30. Id. at 684-85.
31. See Advisory Opinion on Reservations to the Convention on the Pre-
vention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1951) I.C.J. Rep.
15. The test is "the compatibility of a reservation with the
object and purpose of the Convention..." [hereinafter cited as
I.C.J. Report].
32. Harvard Comment, supra note 29, at 685.
33. See I.C.J. Report, supra note 31, at 15.
34. Harvard Comment, supra note 29, at 685.
Under any of the three scenarios, it appears that the rights and
obligations of the United States would not be materially affected by
the interpretation of its understandings by either parties signatory
to the Convention or the International Court of Justice, since the
mechanics of the Genocide Convention make the chances of a dispute
reaching the latter for adjudication appear remote. Furthermore,
failure to ratify would have no effect on the obligations of the United
States to these provisions of the Genocide Convention which merely
restate obligatory customary international law.
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IV. THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION
Article 137 adds genocide to a growing number of international
crimes which nations have agreed to punish in criminal law treaties.
38
In the past, the power of the United States under the Constitution
to make treaties39 in the human rights field has been questioned on the
ground that the treatment by a state of its nationals is a matter of
domestic jurisdiction. However, it can no longer be seriously contended
that human rights are not appropriately the subject of international
agreements. A special committee of prominent lawyers, established by
executive order and headed by the late Supreme Court Justice Tom C. Clark
stated that "treaties which deal with the rights of individuals within
their own countries as a matter of international concern may be a
36. Harvard Comment, supra note 29, at 704.
37. 78 U.N.T.S. 277, 280. The provision of the Genocide Convention
is as follows:
Article 1
The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in
time of peace or in war, is a crime under international law, which
they undertake to prevent and punish. Id.
38. Examples of treaties which outlaw activity as being an international
crime are the International Convention for the Prevention of the
Pollution of the Sea by Oil, 1954, T.I.A.S. No. 4900, The Single
Convention on Narcotic Drugs, March 30, 1961, T.I.A.S. No. 6298,
International Convention to Suppress Slave Trade and Slavery, Sept.
25, 1927, T.S. No. 778.
39. 1950 Hearings, supra note 12, at 206-09.
proper exercise of the treaty-making power of the United States."
40
This can be interpreted as an unequivocal statement of the priority
of human rights over the concept of the sovereignty of the state.
Article 1141 specifies the acts constituting genocide. Much of
the debate over this article centered on the alleged vagueness of
certain of its terms - "in whole or in part," "group," "as such," and
"mental harm." In order to avoid any misinterpretations concerning
terminology, the Senate Committee recommended the first two under-
standings. 42
The first of the understandings defines the phrase which consti-
tutes the essence of the crime of genocide as the "intent to destroy, as
in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group
as such."'4 3 As defined in the first understanding, this would require
the intent to destroy a national group by one of the acts specified
in Article II in such a manner as to affect a substantial part of the
group concerned.44 Intent is the critical element. A combat soldier
engaged in action against hostile troops does not have the requisite
40. 1977 Hearings, supra note 4, at 140. This was the conclusion
reached in a Report in Support of the Treatymaking Power of the
United States in Human Rights Matters.
41. 78 U.M.T.S. 277, 280.
Article II
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts
committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national,
racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole
or in part;
(d) Imposing-measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
Id.
42. See note 28, supra for text.
43. See note 41, supra for text.
44. See note 28, supra for first understanding.
intent since he merely intends to destroy the opposition forces and not
45
a national group. Despite the specific reference in Article I to "time
of war," ratification of the Genocide Convention would not alter the
situation of American military forces in peace or war in any way or
create any new hazards for the military forces. Also public officials
and individuals would not be prosecuted under the Genocide Convention
unless their acts were committed with intent to destroy a group.
The legal efficacy of the Convention is deliberately restricted
by the extreme difficulty of proving the existence of the intent that
is needed to sustain a charge of genocide. Despite an occurrence of
a palpable evil such as the atrocities committed against Hutus in
46
Burundi, the difficulty of establishing the requisite "intent to
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or
religious group, as such" would be profound.
The second understanding substitutes the phrase "permanent impair-
ment of mental faculties 4 7 for the Article II (b) term "mental harm."
48
The ordinary meaning of mental harm might include anything from a
racial slur by an individual to an overt system of governmental discri-
mination. This substitution is to ensure that the mental harm which is
proscribed is that of such a severe nature as to lead to the destruction
of a group. This understanding is designed to protect against frivolous
allegations of genocide.
4 9
ArticleIII 50of the Genocide Convention specifies the five acts
involving genocide which shall be punishable. A consitutional issue
45. 1977 Hearings, supra note 4, at 31.
46. N.Y. Times, June 4, 1972, sec. 4 at 2.
47. See note 28, supra for second understanding.
48, See note 41, supra for art. II (b).
49. Goldberg, Gardner. Time to Act on Genocide Convention, 58 A.B.A.J.
141, 144 (.1972) [hereinafter cited as Goldberg].
50. 78 U.N.T.S. 277, 280.
Article III
The following acts shall be punishable:
(a) Genocide:
(b) Conspiracy to commit genocide;
(c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide;
(d) Attempt to commit genocide;
(e) Complicity in Genocide. Id.
raised is whether the proscription against direct and public encitement
to commit genocide is a restriction on free speech.5 1 This phrase,
however, must be read within the narrow scope of "specific intent" set52
forth in Article II. In 1969, in the case of Brandenburg v. Ohio, the
Supreme Court reaffirmed that even advocacy of force is protected
unless it is directed at inciting lawless action and is likely to
produce it. The language of the Genocide Convention is consistent with
this doctrine.
5 3
Under Article IV,54 the convention is directed at "persons." Conse-
quently, an attempt to accuse the United States government of genocide
is a departure from the language of the Genocide Convention. The exemp-
tion of governments severly limits the practical value of the Genocide
55
Convention, since it is unlikely that the destruction of a group can
be accomplished through other than a systematic governmental effort.
While each government is obligated under the convention to punish
"constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private
56
individuals" responsible for genocidal acts, it is naive to believe
that the government in power would punish a person carrying out its
own program. While governmental immunity from punishment is a drawback,
it is inevitable as long as international law provides no practical
method of punishing a government in power.
51. 1950 Hearings, supra note 9, at 169.
52. 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
53. Goldberg, supra note 49, at 144.
54. 78 U.N.T.S. 277, 280.
Article IV
Persons committing genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in
article III shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally
responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals.
55. Goldenberg, Crimes Against Humanity, 10 W. Ont.L.Rev. 34-35 (1971).
56. See note 54, supra for text.
Article V5 7 makes clear that the Genocide Convention is not
self-executing and that implementing legislation is required to give
effect to its provisions. After ratification of the Convention, and
implementation of the supporting legislation, the ratification would
58
be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. This
procedure is consistent with the proposed United States declaration.
59
Already proposed implementing legislation has been submitted to the
Judiciary Committee of the Congress.
60
Congressional power to legislate the crime of genocide is
found in the Constitution, which states that Congress is empowered, "to
define and punish offenses against the law of nations." 6 1 Approval of
the Convention will, under Article V, require the Congress to exercise
powers it already possesses, but will not extend those powers. While
the implementing legislation will not pre-empt all genocide law, it
will override inconsistent state laws, acts of Congress, or treaties.
62
However, it is difficult to conceive of any state or federal law
inconsistent with a prohibition of the crime of genocide.
57. 78 U.N.T.S. 277, 280.
Article V
The Contracting Parties undertake to enact, in accordance with
their respective Constitutions, the necessary legislation to give
effect to the provisions of the present Convention and, in parti-
cular, to provide effective penalties for persons guilty of
genocide or of any of the other enumerated acts in article III.
58, 1977 Hearings; supra note 4, (statement of Warren Christopher).
59. See note 28, supra for text.
60. 1977 Hearings, supra note 4, at 14.
61. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
62. 1977 Hearings, supra note 4, at 35 (statement by Warren Christopher).
Article V16 3 of the Genocide Convention provides that persons
charged with genocide are to be tried by a competent tribunal of the
state in the territory in which the act was committed. But the history
of negotiation of the Convention makes it abundantly clear that trial
may also occur in the country of which the defendant is a national.
64
The third understanding6 5 attached by the Senate Committee to the
proposed resolution of ratification makes this point of concurrent
jurisdiction. Additionally, the proposed implementing legislation
sets forth the intention of the Congress that the Secretary of State,
in negotiating extradition treaties, is to reserve for the United
States the right to refuse extradition of a United States national to
stand trial on a charge of genocide if the United States intends to
exercise jurisdiction in the case, or if the defendant has been, will
be, or is being prosecuted for the offense in the United States.6 6
63. 78 U.N.T.S. 277, 280.
Article VI
Persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts enumerated
in article III shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State
in the territory of which the act was committed, or by such inter-
national penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to
those Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction.
Id.
64. U.N. Doc. A/790, at 6 (1948). The Legal Commiteee of the United
Nations General Assembly in its report on the Convention to the
General Assembly asserted that article VI did not "affect the right
of any state to bring to trial before its own tribunal any of its
nationals for acts committed outside of the State." Id.
65. See note 28, supra for text.
66. 1973 Report, supra note 19, at S. 3182, 92nd Cong., 2nd Sess. 23
(1972) (appendix) The provisions are as follows:
Sec. 3 It is the sense of the Congress that the Secretary of State
in negotiating extradition treaties or conventions shall reserve
for the United States the right to refuse extradition of a United
States national to a foreign country for an offense defined in
chapter 50A of title 18 of the United States Code, [the genocide
statute] when offense has been committed outside the United States,
and (a) where the United States is competent to prosecute the person
whose surrender is sought, and intends to exercise its jurisdiction,
or (b) where the person whose surrender is sought has already been
or is at the time of the request being prosecuted for such offenses.
In short, the United States may always elect to prosecute a United
States national and thus refuse extradition, no matter where the
alleged crime was committed.
An international penal tribunal, under Article VI, to try persons
charged with genocide has not been established and there are, at
present, no negotiations to that effect.67 If such a tribunal were
to be established, separate action, either through ratification of a
treatyor enactment of a law, would be required for the United States to68
accept its jurisdiction. It is important to note in this connection
that the International Court of Justice would not be the international
penal tribunal since is has no penal or criminal jurisdiction and
considers only cases involving states, not individuals.
69
Article VII 70 of the Genocide Convention pledges the contracting
parties to grant extradition "in accordance with their laws and treaties
in force." United States law provides for extradition only where there
is an extradition treaty in force which covers the crime in question.
71
72
Genocide, at present, is not the subject of any extradition treaty.
Therefore, an extradition treaty covering genocide would have to be
67. Goldberg, supra note 49, at 145.
68. Id.
69. I.C.J. Statute, art. 34, para. 2,
70. 78 U.N.T.S. 277, 282.
Article VII
Genocide and the other acts enumerated in article III shall not
be considered as political crimes for the purpose of extradition.
The Contracting Parties pledge themselves in such cases to grant
extradition in accordance with their laws and treaties in force.
Id.
71. Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 287 (1933).
72. 1977 Hearings, supra note 4, at 23.
negotiated with other countries and ratified by the United States.
73
Furthermore, the Executive's policy on extradition is that it only
extradites a person to a foreign court after assurance that the
prosecution will take place in a competent court which follows our
procedures of due process and there is prima facie evidence that a viola-
74
tion has occurred. With these safeguards, the rights of American
citizens are protected and extradition of United States nationals will
remain under our exclusive control.
Article VIII 75 of the Genocide Convention authorizes any contracting
party to call upon the United Nations to take such action as it considers
"appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide."
This does not constitute an expansion of the powers of the United
Nations but merely confirms the existing right of members of the United
Nations to seek action under the Charter. Any proposed enforcement
action, however, is subject to the United States' veto in the Security
Council.
7 6
77Article IX of the Genocide Convention extends the jurisdiction
of the International Court of Justice to disputes relating to "inter-
pretation, application, or fulfillment of the present Convention
73. Id. at 25.
74. Harvard Comment, supra note 29, at 700-03.
75. 78 U.N.T.S. 277, 282.
Article VIII
Any Contracting Party may call upon the competent organs of the
United Nations to take such action under the Charter of the United
Nations as they consider appropriate for the prevention and suppres-
sion of acts of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in
article III. Id.
76. 1976 Hearings, supra note 24, at 177.
77. 78 U.N.T.S. 277, 282.
Article IX
Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the interpre-
tation, application or fulfillment of the present Convention,
including those relating to the responsibility of a State for
genocide or for any of the other acts enumerated in article III,
shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice at the
request of any of the parties to the dispute. Articles X through
XIX are entirely procedural in matter and are excluded from
discussion. Id.
including those relating to the responsibility of a state for genocide."
The United States has ratified many treaties containing the same type
of provision for the settlement of disputes by the International Court
of Justice. 78 This provision for the settlement of disputes over the
interpretation of the Genocide Convention does not create any real
difficulties. First, the International Court of Justice has no
79
practical enforcement powers. Second, only states party to the
statute, not individuals or groups, can bring disputes before it.
80
Lastly, the Soviet Union and other countries have ratified the Conven-
tion subject to a reservation that they do not consider themselves
81bound by Article IX. As a result, the United States will be in a
position to invoke these countries' reservations in its behalf to
defeat the court's jurisdiction on an estoppel theory if a case charging
genocide should be brought against the United States by these countries.
V. CONCLUSION
The United States has three options regarding the Genocide
Convention: it can reject the Convention, accept it, or accept the
82
Convention with reservations. If the Convention is not accepted, the
United States' obligations will be determined by customary international
law unless it accepts the Convention without reservations, or accepts
the Convention with reservations which are found to be compatible with
the Convention 83 Notwithstanding that the terms of the Genocide
Convention restrict legal action by establishing a strict standard for
78. 1976 Hearings, supra note 24, at 177-78.
79. U.N. Charter art. 94, para. 2.
80. I.C.J. Statute, art 34, para. 1
81. 1976 Hearings, at 178.
82. Harvard Comment, supra note 29, at 703.
83. Id. at 703-04.
59
the requisite intent, 84 omitting governments and states from punishment
85
and including concurrent jurisdiction, 86 the Convention is not rendered
totally ineffective. The Genocide Convention has efficacy as a state-
ment of moral purpose. As the United States is adequately protected,
it is in our national interest to ratify the Convention with the
proposed understandings and declaration and thereby reaffirm the
principles of human dignity protected by the Convention which lie at
the very foundation of our democracy.
Michael P. Murphy
84. See notes 42-46, supra and accompanying text.
85. See notes 54-57, supra and accompanying text.
86. See notes 63-66, supra and accompanying text.
